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RECENT FEDERAL CASE
Wiretapped Evidence-Suit in Federal Court to Enjoin Testimony in
State Proceeding. During the present Term, the Supreme Court of the
United States will hear appellate arguments on another facet of a much-
debated problem: The admissibility of evidence obtained by wiretapping.
The appeal comes from a decision by the Court of Appeals of the Second
Circuit, Pugach v. Dollinger,' which held that its equity power should not
be exercised to enjoin state officials in a state criminal proceeding from di-
vulging information obtained by wiretapping, even if the divulgence in court
would constitute a federal crime under section 605 of the Federal Commu-
nications Act. Justification for this conclusion was found in the policy of
the federal judiciary to refrain from intervention in state criminal proceed-
ings, with special reliance upon Stefanelli v. Minard,2 which was decided
against the background of the fourth amendment.
The pertinent facts in Pugach are these: Plaintiff, approximately two
weeks prior to his trial in a New York county court for alleged burglary,
brought suit in federal district court to enjoin both the county district
attorney and the police commissioner of New York City from using evi-
dence obtained directly by and through wiretapping. His motion for a pre-
liminary injunction was dismissed, and on plaintiff's further motion, the
court of appeals granted a stay, pending hearing of the appeal.3 On that
appeal, the order of the district court was affirmed.
These facts raise complex issues which involve federal-state relationships
in criminal law enforcement; legislative intention lying behind section 605
of the Federal Communications Act; proper applications of constitutional
search and seizure concepts to an evolving statutory approach to the wire-
tapping problem, as well as the power of federal courts to enjoin the pros-
pective commission of a crime by intervening in state criminal proceedings.
To appreciate fully the significance of the Pugach case, and to lay a
foundation for discerning the present judicial atmosphere with regard to
wiretapping problems, it is necessary to summarize and tie together the
Supreme Court's prior decisions relevant to the issues.
Olmstead v. United States,' the Court's first encounter with wiretapping,
placed the device outside the protective scope of the fourth amendment,
finding it to be neither a search nor a seizure. Ten years after this an-
nouncement Congress incorporated section 6055 into the Federal Communi-
1277 F2d 739 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 80 Sup. Ct. 1614 (1960). For other
lower court cases handling similar fact patterns, see Burack v. Liquor Auth., 160 F.
Supp. 161 (E.D. N.Y. 1958); Voci v. Farkas, 144 F. Supp. 103 (E.D. Pa. 1956);
McGuire v. Amrein, 101 F. Supp. 414 (D.Md. 1951).
2342 U.S. 117 (1951).
3 275 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1960).
4277 U.S. 438 (1928).
548 Stat. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952) ; "no person not being authorized by
the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or publish the existence,
contents, substance, purport, effect or meaning of such intercepted communication to
any person...."
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cations Act. It came before the Court in Nardone v. United States.6 That
case saw wiretapped evidence procured by federal officers held inadmissible
in a federal criminal proceeding. The second Nardone case7 developed the
"fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrines and extended the scope of the exclu-
sion to proferred evidence which was obtained through information pro-
cured by wiretapping. In both of the Nardone cases, the Court drew support
from decisions in the constitutional search and seizure area, i.e., using an-
alogous fourth amendment concepts to broaden the effect of section 605.
Schwartz v. Texas9 directed the Court's attention to the issue of whether
wiretapped evidence obtained by state officers must be excluded from state
criminal proceedings because of section 605. Again, the Court accepted a
fourth amendment analogy, drawn from Wolf v. Colorado,10 and held that
Congress did not intend to impose a rule of evidence upon state courts. The
Court further recognized that the divulgence of evidence in a state court-
room by a state officer would be a violation of section 605.1" However, this
fact was viewed as just another consideration for the state court when
devising its own rules of evidence. The Schwartz decision completely
eliminated any chance of arguing that Mr. Justice Roberts' opinion in the
first Nardone case meant that, as well as a prohibition of conduct, Congress
was setting forth an evidentiary rule of exclusion applicable to both federal
and state courts.12
The Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement in this area came in
Benanti v. United States.'8 Wiretapped evidence was procured by state
officers and had been admitted in a federal criminal proceeding. On appeal,
Chief Justice Warren, writing for a unanimous court, rejected an analogy
to the "silver platter doctrine"' 4 and held that the exclusionary rule should
have been followed even though federal officers had no part in obtaining
the evidence.
The Pugach case comes before the Court in a setting where the prior
practice of applying fourth amendment concepts to section 605 cases has
6 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
7308 U.S. 338 (1939).
8 The analogy was taken from Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385, 392 (1920), a case that involved an unreasonable search and seizure. "The essence
of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court, but that it shall not be used
at all." Id. at 392.
9 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
10 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
11 "The problem under § 605 is somewhat different because the introduction of the
intercepted communications would itself be a violation of the statute ....." Schwartz v.
Texas, 344 U.S. 199, 201 (1952).
12 "To recite the contents of the message in testimony before a court is to divulge
the message. The conclusion that the act forbids testimony seems to us unshaken by
the government's arguments." Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937).
13355 U.S. 96 (1957).
14 "[It is] neither necessary nor appropriate to discuss by analogy distinctions sug-
gested to be applicable to the fourth amendment." 355 U.S. at 102. The "silver platter
doctrine," which had been an open question with the Court, was expressly rejected in
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). That case held that evidence obtained




been rejected by the Court's latest declaration on the matter. Whether or
not Benanti was meant to be ad hoc is obviously of much consequence'to
the outcome of the Pugach case.
When these Supreme Court decisions are viewed in light of the legisla-
tive history surrounding section 605, one probably gets as good a look at
judicial legislation as can be seen in any other area.
In the post Olnstead period, there were introduced in Congress at least
seven bills 5 aimed at limiting the use of wiretapping. None passed. In
1934, the Federal Communications Act was enacted. 8 At that time, the
commonly believed purpose was simply to transfer jurisdiction over radio
communications to the Federal Communications Commission. The word-
ing in section 605 is almost identical to the comparable provision of the
previous act regulating communications.17 There seems to be, therefore,
no strong basis for contending that section 605 was intended as anti-wiretap
legislation. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court, in the first Nardone case,
was so convinced. The decisions that followed, while professing to be a
reading of the intent of Congress in order to apply the measure, were ac-
tually writing into section 605 concepts which were drawn, by analogy,
mostly from the fourth amendment area, at least until Benanti.8 Because
of the absence of any real congressional intent, as the Court attempts to
discern the legislative policy behind section 605, one can readily under-
stand why there is disagreement as to the exact nature of such policy.
Nevertheless, the Court has outlined certain basic "policies" underlying
the legislative rule, and these have much to do with shaping the scope of
section 605.'1
Chief Judge Lumbard wrote the majority opinion for the court of appeals,
in Pugach, and it should be critically analyzed. His arguments will be con-
trasted with those of Judge Waterman, who concurred, and Judge Clark,
who dissented.
The Chief Judge relied principally on the "concern for preservation of
the balance between the states' administration of their laws and the use of
federal equity power by restriction or withholding of the power of the fed-
eral courts. ' 20 Any appraisal of these general considerations must be viewed
15 H.R. 4139, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929) ; H.R. 5416, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. (1929.) ;
S. 6061, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931) ; H.R. 23, 72nd Cong, 1st Sess. (1932) ; H.R.
5305, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932) ; H.R. 9893, 72nd Cong., Ist Sess. (1932) ; S. 1396,
72nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1932).
'a48 Stat. 1064-1105 (1934), as amended 50 Stat. 189 (1937), 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609
(1952).
17 44 Star 1172 (W). See S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1934) for
legislative history of section 605.
18 In Goldstein v. United States, 316 U.S. 114 (1942) the "privilege" concept of the
fourth amendment was blended into section 605. Compare, however, the statement in
Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133 (1942), that "[t]he protection intended
and afforded by the statute is of the means of communication and not of the secrecy of
the conversation." The second Nardone case and the Schwartz case also applied
fourth amendment concepts.11 "To forbid the direct use of methods thus characterized but to put no curb on
their full indirect use would only invite the very methods deemed 'inconsistent with
ethical standards and destructive of personal liberty."' (Emphasis added.) Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939).
20 277 F.2d 739, 742 (2d Cir. 1960).
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carefully in light of the New York constitutional provision"' and statute22
permitting wiretapping under certain conditions. In Benanti, the New York
law had been declared to be in conflict with section 605, and therefore in-
valid under the supremacy clause.
23
The crux of the matter is whether a state's power to define its eviden-
tiary rule that admits illegally obtained information, and incidentally in-
dorses a violation of federal law in doing so, is essential to the administra-
tion of state law. In resolving the issue, the majority of the court placed
much reliance on Stefanelli v. Minard.24 In that case an injunction was
sought to prevent New Jersey police, in a state criminal proceeding, from
using evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure. The opinion,
written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter, denied the injunction primarily on two
grounds: (1) the impropriety of federal court intervention with state crimi-
nal processes, and (2) the existence of an adequate remedy, by way of
appeal from a conviction. With respect to the second ground, it was some-
what paradoxical for the majority in Stefanelli to offer the defendant the
hope of having Wolf v. Colorado overruled as an alternative adequate rem-
edy, and then in the same breath, state that the appeal route is adequate
because a conviction based upon the evidence complained of will not cause
irreparable injury. The admission of the evidence, the Court said, would
not deprive the defendant of due process of law (obviously, relying on the
Wolf case for this last proposition).
Another factor that led Chief Judge Lumbard to a denial of relief for
Pugach was "that a court should not enjoin the commission of a crime."
Before embarking on a discussion of the major issues raised in the case,
it is convenient to treat this latter point now. The quoted phrase simply is
not a full and accurate statement of equity policy. As early as In re Debs,25
the Supreme Court held that equity is not without jurisdiction merely be-
cause the threatened conduct is criminal. If other remedies are not as ade-
quate to redress the wrong to plaintiff, equity has jurisdiction to grant relief,
even though the commission of a crime be enjoined. That the legal right
of the plaintiff does not have to be a property right in the traditional sense
is amply illustrated by Rea v. United States,2 which involved a state crimi-
nal prosecution for the possession of narcotics. No more of a "property"
right, as a basis for relief was present there than is present in the Pugach
case. This particular point did not even merit discussion by either the con-
curring or dissenting opinions.
In answer to the majority's position as to federal intervention, Judge
21 N.Y. CoNsT. art. 1, § 12, para. 2 (1938) ; "The right of the people to be secure
against unreasonable interception of telephone and telegraph communications shall not
be violated, and ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation
that there is reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained,
... and particularly describing the person or persons whose communications are to be
intercepted and the purpose thereof."
22 N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 813-A (1942), sets forth the procedural detail pursuant
to the constitutional provision.
23 Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 103-05 (1957).
24 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
25 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
28350 U.S. 214 (1956).
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Waterman, in his concurring opinion, refused to accord Stefanelli v. Minard
any application to the instant situation. The case was distinguished in that
the federal crime, if any, in Stefanelli "had been fully committed before
the federal court was importuned to interfere with the State court proceed-
ings." 27 In Pugach, "the threatened commission of federal crime is sought
to be prevented by an application for relief to a federal court in advance
of the occurrence." 2
The distinction between the two cases may be stated in another way.
At the time injunctive relief was sought in Stefanelli, the violation of the
defendant's civil right had already occurred and the use of the evidence in
court would not be a transgression of the due process requirement. It can
be said that there very well may have been no threatened wrong facing the
defendant by the use of the evidence. Whether section 43 of the Civil Rights
Act, which was the basis for the suit in Stefanelli, would support a claim
due to the use, or threatened use, of the evidence was expressly left open
by the Court. The case was decided on an "assuming-for-the-sake-of-
argument-only basis," and rested on the Court's discretionary determina-
tion not to grant the injunction. Pugach, on the other hand, presents a
situation where not only will a crime surely be committed, but the same
act will give rise to a civil claim for damages.20 Looked at in this manner,
the issue in Pugach is reduced to whether there is an available alternative
remedy as adequate as an injunction, taking into consideration the public
policy complication arising from federal intervention in the state criminal
process.
Language in the Stefanelli opinion sheds further light on the difference
between it and Pugach with respect to the effect of federal intervention.
The Supreme Court's reason, in the former case, for denying an injunction
was based upon the undesirable probability that "every question of pro-
cedural due process of law-with its far-flung and undefined range-
would invite a flanking movement against the system of State courts by
resort to the federal forum, with review if need be to this Court to deter-
mine the issue."8 0 Such reasoning is not applicable to a case like Pugach,
where the divulgence of the evidence in the courtroom is concededly a fed-
eral crime. There is not present the "far-flung and undefined range" of
procedural due process of law. The fact that a legal right will be violated
is already clear beyond argument. The fear of harassment maneuvers on
the part of defendants lacks a realistic foundation. Again, the question
comes down to whether it can be said that the possibility of Schwartz v.
Texas being overturned on appeal from a conviction is sufficient to con-
lude that an alternative remedy exists as "adequate" as an injunction.
Certainly, if Schwartz stands, the defendant will suffer irreparable injury
from a conviction based on the wiretap evidence.
Looking at Stefanelli in a wider context, it appears to be even less in
27 277 F.2d 739, 746 (2d Cir. 1960).
28 Ibid.2 0Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947). (Opinion by L.
Hand, J.).30 342 U.S. 117, 123 (1951).
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point with Pugach. The decision came soon after Wolf v. Colorado and
may be seen as somewhat of a reaffirmation of that controversial holding.
Indeed, if the opposite result had been reached in Stefanelli, Wolf would
have been immediately deprived of its teeth. The Court has gradually, it
seems, become disconcerted with the full scope of the Wolf rule and has
been hacking at the foundation in preparation for its ultimate demise. It
must also be remembered that the Schwartz case drew heavily on the Wolf
rationale. With Benanti's rejection of the fourth amendment analogy in the
near background, it may very well be that the Court is ready to show further
dissatisfaction with the Wolf-Schwartz interpretation of the Constitution.
If so, section 605 could be implemented by granting injunctive relief in
Pugach.
The policy of federal courts not to intervene unnecessarily in state pro-
ceedings, as a consideration in whether to exercise equity power, ought
to be applied on a case by case method. The fact of intervention ought not
to be completely controlling. Yet, this is exactly what was held by the
majority in Pugach. "[W]e do not think that a federal court should inter-
fere with the prosecution of a state criminal proceeding in order to provide
an additional means of vindicating any private rights created by (section)
605."31
Interference with state proceedings has always been an area where fed-
eral courts tread lightly, but the typical statement certainly is not as cate-
gorical as the one made by the majority of the Second Circuit. Interference
with state proceedings does not necessarily preclude the granting of equita-
ble relief by a federal court; this was clearly recognized in Douglas v. City
of Jeanette.3 2 In Rea v. United States,3" injunctive relief was directed at
a federal agent to prevent him in a state proceeding from giving evidence
he obtained by an illegal search and seizure. Although the Court stated
that the direction was not an attempt to disrupt a state forum, but only
an exercise of control over a federal officer, the practical effect, of course,
was to prevent the state court from allowing evidence admissible under its
own rule of evidence.
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Pugach were generally in
accord with one another, except for a curious tributary which brought
judge Waterman to the same result reached by the majority. He assumed
"that divulgence of information obtained by wiretap... will do Pugach
irreparable injury;" but he was "not willing also to assume that a New
York state trial judge will permit such evidence to be admitted over the
objection of defense counsel."3 4 The Court of Appeals of New York, in a
recent case, 5 held it was not error for a trial court to admit wiretap evi-
dence, basing its conclusion on Schwartz. It would seem then that Judge
Waterman must also assume that a New York trial judge will commit
31277 F.2d 739, 743 (2d Cir. 1960).
32 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
83350 U.S. 214 (1956).
34 277 F.2d 739, 745 (2d Cir. 1960). Interestingly enough, one New York trial judge
expressly followed Judge Waterman's advice. See People v. O'Rourke, N.Y. Times,
April 20, 1960, p. 34, Col. 2.
35 People v. Variano, 5 N.Y. 2d 391, 157 N.E. 2d 857 (1959).
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error by refusing to admit probative testimony not coming within any of
the state's exclusionary rules of evidence.
It is next put forth in the concurring opinion that article VI, section 2
of the United States Constitution 6 requires that section 605 be given effect
by a refusal to admit such evidence. If this is correct, there is an obvious
inconsistency between it and the Supreme Court's statement in the Schwartz
case that the crime of divulgence in court is only one consideration for a
state court in formulating rules of evidence. Although the fact of the crimi-
nal act of divulgence ought to be highly persuasive in framing a state rule
of evidence, the Wolf and Schwartz decisions make clear that the Supreme
Court does not yet think that the Constitution requires the adoption of an
exclusionary rule. On this particular point, the case of Testa v. Katt,87
with its broad implications, merits mentioning.
In the Testa case the Court held that a state court must take jurisdiction
in a suit brought on a claim arising under the Emergency Price Control
Act. It was said in the opinion that the policy of the federal act is the pre-
vailing policy in every state and the obligation of states to enforce these
federal laws is not lessened by reason of the form in which they are cast
or the remedy which they provide. As section 605 is violated, whether the
tapper be a federal officer, state officer or an ordinary cltizen, it is obvious
that a state hinders its enforcement and effect when it does not apply the
equivalent of the federal exclusionary rule. A judge is not forced to decide
in a wiretapping situation whether certain action or non-action is "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty" ;s8 he need only note that Congress has
set down a nation-wide policy in prohibiting "any person" from violating
section 605, and that by virtue of the supremacy clause, a state's proper
enforcement of such policy would seem to require the adoption of an ex-
clusionary rule. This argument is directly applicable to a situation such as
was presented in the Schwartz case. If relief is granted Pugach by its ap-
plication, the basis for the holding in Schwartz will be swept away. Yet, it
must be concluded that as the argument was not persuasive in Schwartz,
there is no compelling reason to think the Court will "read" Congress'
intent any differently when deciding Pugach.
It is interesting, also, to notice the dissenting argument of Justice Holmes
in Olmstead v. United States.8 9 He contended that Weeks v. United States40
actually overthrew the common law that probative evidence is admissible
although obtained illegally. Hence, his logical view of the Weeks doctrine
necessarily results in excluding the evidence obtained in violation of a stat-
ute or the fourth amendment. Of course,-the proposition is directly op-
BO "This constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pur-
suance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of
the United States shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
notwithstanding."87330 U.S. 386 (1947).
38 Justice Cardozo's approach to the due process requirement as set forth in Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).39 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
40232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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posed to the rule of the Wolf case and makes Pugach appear to be a case
for application of its logical extension. As the Supreme court seems to be
less favorably disposed to Wolf, and if the current trend, as indicated by
Benanti, is to broaden the effect and protective scope of section 605, while
rejecting fourth amendment analogies, then Justice Holmes' argument may
have the strength of a sleeping lion.
Judge Clark, in his dissenting opinion, proceeded upon the tacit assump-
tion that at least a major part of the policy behind section 605 is a concern
for the privacy of individuals. He also observed that regardless of all policy
arguments, and notwithstanding what the law should be, "we are faced with
repeated open and acknowledged violations of federal law which we are
assured will be continued until and unless federal authorities intervene." 41
This he supported by the apparent fact that there exists only one successful
federal prosecution for a violation of section 605.42
Certainly, the dissent's second thesis takes a broad view of the enforce-
ment problem with respect to wiretaps, but probably goes beyond the im-
mediate concern of the person presently seeking injunctive relief. Convic-
tion and punishment of an officer for violation of section 605 will be of no
help to one such as Pugach if wiretap evidence is properly admitted under
state law. The lack of desire on the part of the federal authorities to prose-
cute public officers for violating the statute is only indicative of the need
for legislative re-examination4 8 and not reason, in itself, for a court to em-
ploy its equity power as a means of law enforcement-especially, criminal
law enforcement.
The Pugach case does not raise a constitutional question per se, nor does
it really present a question of statutory interpretation. Nevertheless, the
decision of the Supreme Court will, no doubt, reflect the present disposition
of the Justices on the ethical and legal status of wiretap evidence. If the
court of appeals is reversed and the injunction granted, the Schwartz case
will be dealt a mortal blow. Perhaps, this would be just as well since
Schwartz rests on the ill-conceived analogy to the Wolf case, and probably,
if not actually, does not correctly read the intent of Congress. If the Court
should affirm, it could do so on grounds which would leave its feelings on
the more important questions open for mere speculation.
It is indeed regrettable that the Benanti case does not permit one to pre-
dict with assurance how the Court will swing on questions such as that
raised in the Pugach case. At certain points in the opinion, Chief Justice
Warren emphasized the factor of a federal conviction brought about by a
federal crime committed in a federal courtroom. This would imply that a
41277 F.2d 739, 747 (2d Cir. 1960).
42 United States v. Gris, 247 F.2d 860 (2d Cir. 1957). Other recent prosecutions under
§ 501 (the penal section of the Federal Communications Act) include the following:
Massicot v. United States, 266 F.2d 955 (5th Cir. 1959) ; Lipinski v. United States,
251 F.2d 53 (10th Cir. 1958) ; Massengale v. United States, 240 F.2d 781 (6th Cir.
1957).
4 See DASH, ScHWARTZ & KNOWLTON, THE EAVESDROPPERS (1959); The Wire-
tapping-Eavesdropping Problem; Reflections on the Eavesdroppers, A Symposium, 44
MiNN. L. REv. 813 (1960) ; Westin, The Wiretapping Problem: An Analysis and a
Legislative Proposal, 52 COLUm. L. REV. 165 (1952).
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state conviction would not so move the Court's concern, and this is supple-
mented by the Court's apparent approval of the Schwartz case. Yet, towards
the end of his opinion the Chief Justice displayed an opposite mood. Re-
garding the contention that Congress did not intend to occupy the field and
abrogate conflicting state laws allowing wiretapping, he recognized the right
of privacy as a policy behind section 605. He stated that "congress, setting
out a prohibition in plain terms, did not mean to allow state legislation
which would contradict that section and that policy."" The writer believes
that this latter reasoning would lead one to a contrary result in a case such
as Schwartz and to a reversal of the Pugach case. If conflicting state legis-
lation is not permissible in the face of the prohibition, then confficting or
hindering state rules of evidence obviously should not be accorded a more
favored position. These incongruous implications from Benanti prevent the
prediction of the outcome in Pugach with any restful assurance.
RoBERT BARONSKY
[EDITOR's NOTE: Subsequent to the setting in type of the above article,
the Supreme Court, on February 27, 1961, in a per curiam opinion,
affirmed (7-2) the Second Circuit's decision. In a one-sentence opinion,
the majority cited Schwartz v. Texas and Stefanelli v. Minard as authority.
Mr. Justice Douglas wrote a dissenting opinion, with which Mr. Chief
Justice Warren concurred. The two dissenters accepted the implication
from the Benanti case that the Schwartz rationale no longer could stand.
Deeming a state exclusionary rule to be obligatory, an injunction was
thought to be an appropriate remedy in a case such as Pugach. However,
since the Schwartz case still holds the favor of the majority of the Court,
it was reasoned that "this [the injunctive] remedy is the only one which
is available to protect the federal right." The dissenting opinion contained
no arguments to distinguish the Stefanelli case; instead, there was direct
disagreement with the rationale of the case and its further application in
Pugach.
Apparently, the Court is rather solidly behind Schwartz and will not
allow a federal injunction to diminish its effect. Perhaps, the feeling among
the majority is that if the widespread practice of section 605 violations,
with its encouragement from state evidentiary rules, is so distasteful, proper
recourse should be through legislative action.]
44355 U.S. 96, 105 (1957).
1961]
